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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT IS NOT LIMITED TO THE 
EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN THE CROMEENS 
AFFIDAVIT, AND MAY CONSIDER THE 
ALLEGATIONS IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
IWMC, at page 7 of the Appellee's Brief, asserts 
that this court's review of the trial court's decision is 
limited to the evidence contained in the Cromeens affidavit 
and its supporting exhibits, citing Roskelly & Co. v. Lerco, 
Inc. , 610 P.2d 1307, 1310, (Utah 1980). IWMC seems to be 
arguing that this court cannot consider plaintiff's 
allegation, in its complaint, of tortious negligence and 
product liability, in the face of the Cromeens affidavit. 
Such is not the holding of Roskelly. Roskelly held only 
that when jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff cannot rely 
solely on allegations of jurisdiction in its complaint in 
the face of an affidavit by defendant which specifically 
contradicts those general allegations. Nothing in the 
Cromeens affidavit specifically contradicts plaintiff's 
allegations of negligence (Complaint, Second Cause of 
Action, R at 2-3) and product liability (Complaint, First 
Cause of Action, R at 1-2). Paragraph 1-9 of the Cromeens 
affidavit concern only the sale of the jointing machine and 
IWMC's marketing contacts with Utah. The remaining 
paragraph, number 10, concerns the IWMC service 
representative's visit to Utah to inspect the machine in 
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1982. There simply is nothing in the affidavit to 
contradict plaintiff's claims. 
In paragraph number 10 of the Cromeens affidavit, 
and the attached service report, IWMC claims that the 
machine had been modified substantially during the ten year 
period since it had left the Company's possession, and that 
this alleged modification caused the popping out of wood. 
The facts, however, even assuming arguendo their accuracy, 
go to the merits of IWMC's defense, and are not 
jurisdictional. In determining jurisdiction, our courts are 
not concerned with the merits of any alleged claims or 
defenses, but only with the question of jurisdiction. 
Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791 (Utah 1988); Pellegrini v. 
Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974). 
II. MR. ARGUELLO'S INJURY DID ARISE FROM 
IWMC'S CONDUCT DIRECTED TOWARD UTAH. 
IWMC cites to the Roskelly case also for the 
proposition that Mr. Arguello's injuries did not arise from 
IWMC's conduct directed toward Utah. The Roskelly case, 
however, concerned a claim for a sales commission and 
plaintiff's allegation that defendant "does business within 
the State of Utah and has significant contacts with the 
State of Utah." 610 P.2d 1307, at 1309 (emphasis added). 
The statutory jurisdictional basis for this allegation would 
be Section 78-27-24 (1), Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
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However, Mr. Arguello alleged as the statutory 
jurisdictional basis in this case both Section 78-27-24(1) 
and Section 78-27-24(3), (the causing of any injury within 
this state whether tortious or by breach of warranty). In 
Roskelly, there was a finding of no in personam jurisdiction 
because although the defendant, a Kentucky corporation, 
transacted business in Utah, the plaintiff's cause of action 
did not arise out of the business transacted within Utah. 
In the present case, Mr. Arguello contends that 
IWMC put the jointing machine in the stream of commerce 
knowing it could be resold in Utah. This is conduct 
directed towards Utah. In Smith v. York Food Machinery Co., 
81 Wash.2d 719, 504 P.2d 782 (1972), a Washington resident 
sued two non-resident manufacturers for injuries sustained 
when cleaning a defective food processing machine. The 
machine was manufactured originally by a Pennsylvania 
company (Motter) for another Pennsylvania company (York). 
York subsequently sold the machine to an Idaho company 
(Seabrook Farms), and Seabrook, several years later, 
transferred it to Lamb-Weston Company of Washington. 
Neither York nor Motter maintained an office or registered 
to do business in Washington, and prior to the injury 
complained of, neither York nor Motter knew the machine in 
question was in Washington. The Washington Supreme Court 
sustained personal jurisdiction over both Motter and York 
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for causing tortious injury, under a stream of commerce 
theory, and observed: 
It is not unforeseeable that a 
company using a large machine with a 
long-term useful life, as the one here, 
will sell or transfer it to another 
company in an adjoining state. This is 
particularly true if the manufacturer has 
attempted to create a potential market 
for its product in that neighboring state 
by the use of advertising and customer 
contact... 504 P.2d 782, at 786. 
See also, Look v. Hughes Tool Co., 367 F.Supp. 1003 (D.N.H. 
1973) (plaintiff injured in New Hampshire by a "digger" 
manufactured by Delaware corporation with no direct contacts 
with New Hampshire. Court found it reasonably foreseeable 
that a digger sold to a Maine firm would be used in New 
Hampshire.) 
III. 0.3 PERCENT OF IWMC'S TOTAL SALES 
VOLUME IS NOT AN INSIGNIFICANT AMOUNT. 
IWMC cites Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. 
Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1985), 
cert, den. , 75 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 853 (1986) for, among 
other things, its passing reference to defendant's sales in 
Utah being only 0.1 percent of its sales. While not really 
relevant to an analysis of personal jurisdiction under 
Section 78-27-24(3), since Mr. Arguello also contends 
Section 78-27-24(1) is a jurisdictional basis, the case of 
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Mark v. Obear & Sons, Inc., 313 F.Supp. 373 (D. Mass. 1970), 
held that annual revenue of only $5,000.00 was not an 
insubstantial contact as a matter of law. 
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